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Using data drawn from the Brazilian Central Bank Credit 
Information System, this paper evaluates the impact of the 
use of collateral on the probability of default and, 
consequently, on capital requirement levels in the Brazilian 
financial system. Literature suggests that the existence of 
collateral in some credit operations increases the debtor's 
readiness to honor its commitment and, therefore, could 
result in a lower probability of default. The methodology 
used to calculate capital requirements is based on the Basel 
II IRB-Foundation Approach, although the probabilities of 
default have been estimated by historical averages 
following Basel II orientation, and corroborated by a 
logistic regression model. The test of hypothesis about 
difference between collateralized and uncollateralized 
probabilities of default for each risk class indicates that they 
are statistically different. This result was obtained both from 
historical average probability of default as from logistic 
regression model. 
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Under specific conditions, including the 11% capital 
requirement adopted in Brazil and Loss Given Default set at 
45%, this paper also seeks to identify an equivalence factor 
of the ratio between capital requirements for credit risk in 
the Standardized Simplified Approach and that calculated 
through the IRB-Foundation Approach. For the sample 
utilized, the results indicate that collateralized nonretail 
operations have an average default probability of 2.46% and 
an equivalence factor of 60%. In contrast, uncollateralized 
nonretail operations have an average default probability of 
6.66% and an equivalence factor of 93%, quite close to the 
100% weighting factor of the Standardized Simplified 
Approach. 
 





1.  Introduction 
Announced in June 2004, the New Capital Accord (Basel II)
1 introduces a series 
of principles and recommendations aimed at enhancing international financial system 
protection and solidity. Among other things, the Accord specifies parameters for 
calculating regulatory capital needed to cope with the market, credit and operational 
risks to which financial institutions are subject. 
By expanding utilization of credit risk mitigating instruments in reducing capital 
requirements, Basel II innovates in the calculation of capital requirements. Viewed in 
terms of the borrower's probability of default, this paper seeks to assess the impact of 
utilization of collateral on capital charge (CC) levels of National Financial System 
institutions. The analysis restricts itself to the segment of nonretail operations
2, since a 
specific weighting factor has already been determined for the retail segment
3.  
The Basel Committee developed two approaches to calculating CC on credit risk 
portfolio: the Standardized Approach and the Internal Rating-Based Approach or IRB 
Approach. In both cases, CC on credit risk is a percentage of the value of the 
institution's exposure, weighted by risk factors. However, the difference between the 
two approaches is found in the way the risk weighting factors are obtained: in the first 
approach, ratings specified by external agencies or parameters determined by regulatory 
entities are used, while internal rating systems developed by the financial institutions 
themselves are used in the second approach. 
This study uses the IRB Approach as the CC calculation model since, with 
implementation of the Standardized Simplified Approach (SSA), the next CC model to 
be adopted by financial institutions in Brazil will most likely be the IRB Approach.
4 
There are two CC calculation methods in the IRB Approach: the IRB-
Foundation Approach, in which PD is estimated by the banks and the other risk 
components – LGD (Loss Given Default), EAD (Exposure at Default) and M (Maturity) 
                                               
1 International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards – A Revised Framework, 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, BIS, 2004. 
2 In this segment, only operations classified as “specific nature” and based on nonearmarked resources 
were considered. 
3 According to the Brazilian Central Bank Circular 3.360/2007, the weighting factor is 75%. 
4 Following the schedule presented in Brazilian Central Bank Communiqué n. 12,746/2004.  
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- are given by the supervisory entity, and the IRB Advanced Approach, in which all risk 
components are estimated by the institutions. 
The basic version of the IRB Approach is used in this study in order to verify the 
impact that the use of collateral provokes on PD and, consequently, on CC in the IRB 
Foundation Approach. 
It should be mentioned that literature recognizes the direct impact of collateral 
on LGD, since it raises the rate of credit recovery. Nonetheless, some studies evaluate 
the relation between collateral and borrower risk. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) observe a 
different context to study collateral and borrower risk relationship. According to them, 
in the credit market, the information asymmetry between borrower and lender can lead 
to problems such as adverse selection and moral hazard
5. In this case, the price forming 
mechanism is not efficient. The interest rates are greater and only riskier projects are 
selected, which leads to a worsening of the portfolio credit quality. In this context, the 
collateral is used as a discipline mechanism, acting as an incentive to less risky 
behaviors. In other words, the presence of collateral would be associated to a smaller 
PD. Wette (1983) describes that Stiglitz and Weiss’ (1981) reasoning related to adverse 
selection also occurs on environments where the clients are risk neutral. 
According to Bester (1985), financial institutions decide to grant credit based on 
a simultaneous choice of interest rates and collateral according to the 
operation/borrower risk level. Besides, Bester (1995) shows that low default probability 
clients are more inclined to accept greater collateral volume request from financial 
institutions than greater interest rates. Among riskier loans, the reasoning is the inverse. 
Besanko and Thakor (1987) also study the loan grant in an asymmetric 
information context (a priori, lenders do not know borrowers´ PD) under a 
multidimensional pricing model which considers credit value, interest rate and collateral 
required, as well as possibility of rationing. The authors found a negative relationship 
between collateral and borrower risk. 
Boot, Thakor and Udell (1991) try to answer theoretical and empirically the 
following question: under which conditions there is a positive relationship between 
                                               
5 Santos (2005) argues that information asymmetry and adverse selection are more relevant for micro and 
small companies credit market compared to corporate credit market, because banks invest more on better 
knowledge about their potential clients.  
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borrower risk and collateral? In this case, the authors develop a competitive equilibrium 
analysis, also considering moral hazard and private information issues. The first issue 
would come from lenders incapacity to observe, after the loan is granted, the borrower´s 
actions that would affect the projects payoff from which the loan would be paid. The 
second issue would come from the fact that lender does not know borrower risk profile 
before loan granting; such would be a borrower private information (asymmetric 
information). The authors show that collateral is a powerful instrument to mitigate 
moral hazard, although this imposes deadweight repossession cost to lender. Thus, the 
authors obtain a positive relationship between collateral requirements and borrower risk. 
Though, when it is considered the private information in analysis, this positive 
relationship may be accented or diminished, being possible to observe greater collateral 
requirement from riskier or less risky borrower. 
In this way, according to Jimenez and Saurina (2004), there are two alternative 
interpretations of the relationship between collateral and the borrower's PD. On the one 
hand, assuming that the possibility of execution is very small, low risk borrowers prefer 
to offer high-quality collateral. Consequently, collateral functions as a signal, making it 
possible for the institution to reduce the problem of adverse selection caused by 
informational asymmetry between the institution and the borrower at the moment in 
which the loan is granted. Therefore, a negative relationship between collateral and PD 
would be expected, based on the hypothesis that collateral is a sign of a high-quality 
borrower. 
On the other hand, there is a general perception among lenders that the need for 
collateral is associated to the low quality of the credit, thus resulting in a positive 
relationship between collateral and PD. Using the first interpretation, this paper 
investigates a possible indirect impact of collateral on PD that, following the IRB 
Approach, influences capital charge levels of the institutions involved. 
Various studies have dealt with the question of estimating PD. In Brazil, 
Schechtman et al. (2004) utilize a credit scoring model based on logistic regression to 
calculate the PD of a credit portfolio through the use of data drawn from the Central 
Bank's former Credit Risk Center (CRC). The purpose of that study is to identify the 
significant variables that influence PD.  
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Parente and Costa (2003) use CRC data to verify the importance of information 
drawn from public centers in evaluating the credit risk of Brazilian companies. Utilizing 
a default forecasting model, the authors identified the variable related to the credit 
volume in arrears as the most important in explaining borrower behavior. Parallel to 
this, the variable related to co-obligations indicates that a company's PD drops as the 
level of collateral increases. 
Based on a one year migration matrix, Carneiro et al. (2005) defines the proxy 
for PD. This matrix is calculated according to the client quantity criterion from 2002 to 
2004 for each banking entity included in the study. The concept of delinquent credits 
identified in the study is that used for clients with risk classifications from E to H. This 
criterion is based on Resolution n. 2,682, dated December 21, 1999, which determines 
that credits overdue for more than 90 days are to be rated no higher than E
6. 
Using the IRB Foundation Approach and based on credit operations registered in 
the Central Bank Credit Information System (CIS) between June/2004 and June/2006, 
the objective of this paper is to assess the indirect impact through PD of utilization of 
collateral on the CC of financial institutions. The CIS is the credit operation databank 
that succeeded the CRC. The original system was implemented in 1997 by CMN 
Resolution n. 2,390, dated May 22, 1997, which determined that financial institutions 
were obligated to send information on their clients’ debts and liabilities for guarantees 
to the Central Bank of Brazil. In 2002, Circular n. 3,098, dated March 20, 2002, 
broadened the scope of the information included in the database, thus giving rise to the 
CIS. 
As one result, the paper identifies the risk weighting factors that equalize total 
CC
7 between the SSA and the IRB Foundation Approach. It should be mentioned that in 
Brazil, the regulation indicates lower weighting factors for specific exposures, which 
were not included in this study. From the exposures that SSA deals in the same way, 
with no discrimination between collateralized and uncollaterized operations, the 
calculation of the equivalence factor aims to verify the existence of a possible 
differentiation of the risk weighting factor for collateralized operations. 
                                               
6 Except in those cases in which maturity of the operation is greater than 36 months. In this case, 
calculation of twice the period of arrears is permitted according to the terms of the cited Resolution. 
7 Defined here as capital requirements (CC) plus provisions.  
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The study is divided into four sections. The following section describes the 
methodology employed. The results are found in the third section, followed by 
conclusions in the fourth and final section. 
 
2.  Methodology 
In Brazil, the regulation defining SSA was issued on September/2007 through 
the Resolution 3.490 and Circular 3.360, which determined that CC on credit risk, 
known as the Portion referring to Risk Weighted Assets – PRWA, must be at least equal 
to: 
 




j RWA ov EAD RWF RWA P Pr 11 , 0 11 , 0 ,    (1) 
 
in which: 
RWAl= Risk Weighted Asset of the j-th operation, net of provisions; 
RWFj= Risk Weighting Factor of the j-th operation; 
EADj= Exposure at Default, equal to the debt balance of the operation on the date of 
calculation; and 
Provj= Provisions of the j-th operation, calculated according to the terms of Resolution 
n. 2,682/99. 
According to the regulation, the Brazilian Central Bank defined standardized 
RWFs for the credit operations of all financial institutions. Recognizing the effect of 
credit risk mitigators, as stated in the Basel II Accord, Circular 3.360/2007 indicated 
lower weighting factors for specific exposures. For example, depending on the 
relationship between the debt balance of the operation and the assessment value of the 
collateral, the weighting factor can be as low as 35% in real estate financing guaranteed 
by chattel mortgages and 50% in mortgage-guaranteed home loans. The standard factor 
was set at 100% for exposures for which no specific FPR was defined. 
In the IRB Approach, exposures are divided into classes and each class has its 
own specific risk weighting function. The exposure classes are as follows: corporate  
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exposure (five subclasses), sovereign exposure, bank exposure, retail exposure (three 
subclasses) and equity exposure. 
According to the IRB Approach, CC for corporate, sovereign and bank exposure 
is calculated as follows: 
∑ × =
j
j RWA CC % 8 ,     (2) 
in which:    
( ) EAD K RWA × × = % 8
1
,   (3) 
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The parameters above must be calculated separately for each credit exposure. In 
the IRB-Foundation, LGD is set at 45% and M at 2.5 years. 
In this study, the basic version of the IRB Approach was employed. 
Consequently, estimation of the debtors’ PDs became a sine qua non condition for 
calculating CC on the credit risk of the exposures and evaluating the impact of the 
utilization of mitigators on this charge. 
The mitigating instrument considered in this study was collateral. This study is 
not based on the personal collateral mitigator, since this type of collateral would result 
in estimation of PDs associated to the guarantor and not to the borrower. Identification 
of personal guarantors would demand cross-referencing of data that would be extremely 
costly in operational terms and, therefore, would go well beyond the scope of this study. 
The major types of collateral in the CIS are mortgages, chattel mortgages, liens and 
                                               
8 In equation (4), N(.) and N
-1(.) are the cumulative distribution functions of the Standardized Normal and 
its inverse, respectively.   
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credit assigns. It is important to underscore that this study considered only the question 
of whether the operation did or did not have collateral registered in the CIS, without 
reference to the value of such collateral. The reason for this is that this information is 
obligatory only for relevant operations or, in other words, those with values of more 
than R$ 5 million. 
It should be mentioned that although, in Brazil, only the biggest banks should 
apply for the IRB Foundation model, in this study all the banks were included since the 
operations in the CIS are not identified. 
The starting point of this paper is a set of credit operations used to calculate the 
PDs of the borrowers/operation in each risk category, according to the terms of 
Resolution n. 2,682/99. The set of credit operations in question was the stock of 
nonretail operations or, more specifically, all operations with clients with overall 
liability
9 of more than R$ 100,000.00 registered in the CIS on June 30, 2004. Aside 
from this, only operations granted by the institution and still in its active portfolio and 
operations based on nonearmarked resources were utilized. Consequently, such 
operations as those based on BNDES
10 resources were excluded. 
One of the reasons underlying exclusion of retail operations is the fact that they 
are dealt with in a differentiated manner in Circular 3.360/2007. According to that 
document, retail operations that, among other characteristics, are defined as those in 
which debtors have total liability of less than R$400,000.00 will have a risk weighting 
factor of 75%, according to Basel II. In this paper, the operations were selected before 
the Circular had been issued and the definition was based on the draft where the limit 
was lower. 
Some credit modalities are no longer considered in the survey, since they have 
special characteristics that could influence PDs and make it difficult to analyze the 
impact of collateral: rural and agribusiness financing, real estate financing, earmarked 
credits, co-obligations, working capital operations with maturities of less than 30 days, 
compror and vendor credits and stock and bond financing. 
                                               
9 In calculating total liability, credit operations in active portfolios with matured and maturing balances, 
co-obligations and balances registered as losses are all taken into consideration. 
10 Brazilian Development Bank.  
12 
 
The rural and agribusiness financing modality is a highly specific market 
segment, with its own peculiarities as regards interest rates, funding, application of 
credits, and so forth. Real estate financing already has a specific weighting factor in 
Basel II, as indicated in Circular 3.360/2007. Earmarked credits are compulsory by 
nature since there is an absolute link between funding and utilization of these resources. 
Though credit risk does exist, there is no predefined flow of payments in the co-
obligations modality. According to the methodology adopted in this study, this flow 
would be required to calculate PD. The modality of working capital credits with 
maturities of less than 30 days was excluded, since financial institutions normally roll 
over these credits repeatedly. Evidently, this would require a differentiated methodology 
to calculate PD. Compror, vendor and stock and bond financing credits normally 
involve self-liquidity mechanisms that differentiate them from other modalities. 
Finally, operations in the Consumer Credit – Automobile Loan modality were 
not included in the study. During treatment of the database, signs of inconsistencies in 
the information supplied by financial institutions were detected, specifically with 
respect to the collateral offered in these operations. Since this is a credit modality in 
which the collateral of the financed item normally has a significant impact on the risk 
level of the operation, inconsistencies in the data could jeopardize the result of the study 
as a whole. For this reason, it was decided that this modality would be excluded from 
the study and would be dealt with in a specific paper in the future. 
Operations were separated into groups according to type of collateral: no 
collateral whatsoever, only real collateral, real and personal collateral and only personal 
collateral. Only the first two groups were considered in this paper, since analysis of 
personal collateral would imply estimation of the PD of the guarantor and not of the 
borrower/operation. 
After filtering the relevant credit modalities, a final filter was seen to be 
necessary in order to make the study operationally feasible and relevant to the credit 
market under analysis: 1) select modalities in which, individually, each of the total 
value of collateralized operations and the total value of uncollateralized operations 
represent at least 10% of the sum total of collateralized and uncollateralized operations; 
and 2) among the modalities selected above, choose those in which both of the quantity  
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of collateralized and uncollateralized operations represent at least 10% of the total sum 
of collateralized and uncollateralized operations. 
In this way, eight modalities were considered after the final filter. These are as 
follows: 1) special overdraft checks and accounts; 2) personal credit - excluding payroll-
deducted loans; 3) working capital credits with maturities of more than 30 days; 4) other 
loans; 5) consumer loans - other goods; 6) other financing; 7) import financing; 8) other 
credits/debtors for purchases of securities and goods. 
Following identification of the eight modalities studied in this paper, the 
operations were grouped according to risk category
11 and monitored over a 12-month 
period starting on June 30, 2004. The objective here was to identify those registering 
defaults during that period. The default criterion chosen was that referring to credit 
operations in arrears for more than 90 days or with risk ratings of E, F, G or H or 




Monitoring of these operations over time made it possible to calculate the 
proportion of operations in default at any moment in the 12-month period after June 30, 
2004, compared to the total number of operations existent on that date for each risk 
category
15. In this way, PD estimates by risk category were obtained for both 
collateralized and uncollateralized operations, implicitly assuming that observed 
frequency of default is a good proxy for PD. In order to verify if the differences 
between the frequencies of default of each group (collateralized and uncollateralized 
operations) were statistically significant, a test of hypothesis about this difference was 
conducted. 
Furthermore, a logistic regression model was developed in order to investigate 
the relevance of collateral as an independent variable on the behavior of the probability 
of default. The other independent variables used in the model were suggested by 
                                               
11 Though Basel II (paragraph 404) recommends utilization of at least seven risk brackets for operations 
that are not in default, this study utilized the first five risk classes (AA, A, B, C and D) of Resolution n. 
2,682/99, as stated in the CIS. 
12 In Resolution 2,682/99, risk classification is based primarily on the question of arrears. Operations with 
arrears of 90 days are classified no higher than level E. 
13 In those cases in which the period to maturity was greater than 36 months on June 30, 2004, the 
criterion of arrears was calculated at twice its value, according to Resolution 2,682/99. 
14 In order to prevent inconsistency among ratings of financial institutions, we chose the worst case 
between the classification based on credit in arrears and the rating given by the financial institution.  
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Schechtman et al. (2004). Many of these variables were categorical and they were 
transformed into dummy variables. The variable for collateral was one of these cases 
and based on its coefficient signal, it was possible to critique the test of hypothesis 
findings. The variables data were collected based on information from June 30, 2004 to 
June 30, 2005. The sample was split into two parts, one to estimate the model and the 
other to evaluate and adjust the model. Section 3 shows how the model was constructed, 
as well as its main findings. 
Even though Basel II suggests utilization of data for a period of at least five 
years, only two dates were considered for calculating the annual rate of default: June 30, 
2004 and June 30, 2005. The reason for this was the simple fact that the CIS has not 
been in existence for five years. The same eight modalities of the stock used in the 
previous year were also applied to operations on June 30, 2005. From that point 
forward, all procedures used to estimate PD as described above were repeated. At the 
end, the simple average between the annual rate of default in 2004 and in 2005 was 
calculated for each risk category and used as proxy for estimating the PD of each 
category. 
After estimating PD for each risk rating, the next step was to calculate the CC of 
operations existent on June 30, 2006. In this case, only operations belonging to the eight 
modalities previously chosen and to the two groups of operations considered 
(collateralized and uncollateralized) were selected. 
The risk classification for the operations in each group was given on the basis of 
the classification obtained in June 2006. Consequently, based on the estimates obtained, 
PD was associated to this classification. In this study, the LGD level utilized was 45%, 
as defined in the IRB Foundation Approach of Basel II. The capital requirement (K) for 
each group was determined according to the already cited IRB-Foundation Approach 
formulas. In the same way, the K was calculated using the maturity (M) of 2.5 years. 
However, an analysis of K sensitivity to various other M levels was also carried out, 
with M varying at six months intervals. 
Starting with the individual values of K in each one of the two groups of 
operations, the value of Risk Weighted Asset (RWA) was calculated per operation with 
                                                                                                                                        
15 This methodology is consistent with the document "An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk 
Weight Functions", BIS, July 2005.  
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the percentage of 11% and not 8% as specified in Basel II. Consequently, the formulas 
of RWA of the j-th operation and of CC for operations existent on June 30, 2006 had to 
be redefined, as follows: 
 
j j j EAD K RWA × × =
% 11
1
,      (8) 











j EAD K EAD K RWA CC
% 11
1
% 11 % 11
,    (9) 
A decision was made to utilize total CC (CC plus provisions) in order to 
evaluate the indirect impact of the collateral mitigator on the CC of National Financial 
System institutions, in light of the differentiated levels of provisioning between the 
SSA, for which the percentages used in this study are defined in Resolution 2,682/99, 
and the IRB Foundation Approach, in which the percentages are given by the levels of 
expected loss (PD times LGD). 
Aside from this, it was also possible to compare the determinant risk weighting 
factor of CC in the IRB Foundation Approach with that of SSA. To do this, a factor had 
to be found for which total CC would be identical for the two approaches (equation 10). 
In this paper, this factor was denominated the equivalence factor and was obtained as 
shown below: 





























× × + ×
∑
∑ ∑ ∑



















ov EAD LGD PD EAD K
F
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Pr 11 , 0
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Pr Pr 11 , 0
   (10) 
Calculated for both the collateralized and uncollateralized groups of operations, 
the equivalence factor makes it possible to measure the impact that collateral would 
have through PD on the SSA weighting factor. Though SSA deals equally with all 
operations, with no discrimination between collateralized and uncollateralized credits, 
one should recall that the objective sought in calculating the equivalence factor is to 
verify the existence of a possible differentiation of the risk-weighting factor for 




3.  Results 
3.1.  Probability of Default Estimation 
The initial quantities of operations in the nonretail group reached 872,000 and 
911,000 on June 30, 2004 and June 30, 2005, respectively, the two dates used as bases 
for estimating PDs. After filtering the operations, the final stock dropped to 184,000 in 
June 2004 and 185,000 in June 2005. 
Even after application of the filters, the profile of the final stock of operations in 
terms of types of collateral was quite similar to the profile of the initial stock, on both 
June 30, 2004 and June 30, 2005. This suggests that the data selected are adequate for 
analysis of the impact of the collateral mitigator.  
Tables 1 and 2 below present estimates of PD broken down by risk classification 
in the period from June 30, 2004 to June 30, 2005 and from June 30, 2005 to June 30, 
2006, for the groupings of uncollateralized and collateralized operations, respectively. 
The quantity of operations and the weighted arithmetic average of PDs by risk 
classification are also presented. This average was used as the final estimate for 
calculating CC on June 30, 2006. PDs were also estimated stratified according to 
modalities and risk classification in the same periods and the results can be found in 
Table A at the Appendix. 
Table 1 – Estimated default probabilities for uncollateralized operations 
stratified according to risk classification  
Class   Total 
June 30, 2004 
PD 
June 30, 2004 to 
June 30, 2005 
Total 
June 30, 2005 
PD 
June 30, 2005 to 
June 30, 2006 
Average PD 
AA  21,402   1.19%   15,400   1.05%  1.12% 
A  37,110   3.77%   24,419   3.68%  3.72% 
B   27,186   5.89%   29,200   6.34%  6.11% 
C   24,389   8.58%   18,894   10.38%  9.48% 
D   5,674   33.63%   4,493   38.59%  36.11% 
E  1,860   100.00%   1,796   100.00%  100.00% 
F   1,506   100.00%   1,346   100.00%  100.00% 
G   1,117   100.00%   1,026   100.00%  100.00% 
H   6,528   100.00%  5,581   100.00%  100.00% 




Table 2 – Estimated default probabilities for collateralized operations stratified 
according to risk classification  
Class   Total 
June 30, 2004 
PD 
June 30, 2004 to 
June 30, 2005 
Total 
June 30, 2005 
PD 
June 30, 2005 to 
June 30, 2006 
Average PD 
AA   13,459   0.72%   12,818   0.60%  0.66% 
A   19,916   0.75%   32,955   1.30%  1.02% 
B   11,106   1.42%   14,463   2.25%  1.83% 
C   8,918   2.77%   15,559   5.36%  4.06% 
D   2,100   13.57%   3,468   20.47%  17.02% 
E   237   100.00%   699   100.00%  100.00% 
F   279   100.00%   557   100.00%  100.00% 
G   74   100.00%   362   100.00%  100.00% 
H   768   100.00%   2,408   100.00%  100.00% 
TOTAL  56,857     83,289      
 
In the two periods considered, PDs increased as the risk classification of the 
operation worsened. Aside from this, the default rates found in classes AA to D in the 
group of collateralized operations were smaller than in the other group. The weighted 
averages of PDs for the portfolio of collateralized operations not in default was 1.69% 
and 3.00% for 2005 and 2006, respectively, while PDs were 6.27% and 7.15% for the 
portfolio of uncollateralized operations not in default, respectively. Taken by 
themselves, these amounts suggest that uncollateralized operations have a greater 
chance of default. A test of hypothesis about difference in proportion was carried out in 
order to test whether the lesser difference between PDs obtained for the collateralized 
group of operations and those obtained for the uncollateralized group in each risk 
classification is statistically significant. Specification of the test and its results are found 
on Table 3. One can conclude that, for all of the risk categories considered, the samples 
supplied sufficient evidence to detect a negative difference between collateralized PD 







Table 3 – Test of Hypothesis about difference between 
collateralized and uncollateralized PDs obtained for each risk class.  
H0: Collateralized PD - Uncollateralized PD = 0 
H1: Collateralized PD - Uncollateralized PD PD < 0 
  Significance level of 5%   
June 30, 2004 to June 30, 2005 





between PDs  Test Statistic  Result 
AA 0.72%  1.19%  -0.47%  -4,2795  Rejects  H0 
A 0.75%  3.77%  -3.02%  -21,1564  Rejects  H0 
B 1.42%  5.89%  -4.46%  -18,9342  Rejects  H0 
C 2.77%  8.58%  -5.81%  -18,3675  Rejects  H0 
D 13.57%  33.63%  -20.06%  -17,4477  Rejects  H0 
Average PD  1.69%  6.27%  -4.58%  -41,5633  Rejects H0 
June 30, 2004 to June 30, 2005 





between PDs  Test Statistic   Result 
AA 0.60%  1.05%  -0.45%  -4,1173  Rejects  H0 
A 1.30%  3.68%  -2.38%  -18,7434  Rejects  H0 
B 2.25%  6.34%  -4.09%  -18,4935  Rejects  H0 
C 5.35%  10.38%  -5.03%  -17,0041  Rejects  H0 
D 20.47%  38.59%  -18.12%  -17,3804  Rejects  H0 
Average PD  3.00%  7.15%  -4.15%  -38,5423  Rejects H0 
 
3.2.  Logistic Regression 
Consider a set of p independent variables denoted by  ( ) p x x x x ,..., , 2 1 = ′ , the 
vector of the i
th row of matrix (X) of explicative variables. Each element of matrix (X) 
correspond to (xij), where i = 1, 2,..., n and j = 0, 1,..., p, with xi0 = 1. Given Y the 
outcome variable from a multiple regression model, where Y has a Bernoulli probability 
distribution with success parameter  i π . Suppose the conditional success probability is 
given by  () () x x Y P π = =1  and the conditional failure probability is denoted by 
()() x x Y P π − = = 1 0.  
The logit of the logistic regression model is given by the equation 









= π . The vector of unknown 
parameters is given by  () ′ + + + + = p β β β β β ... 2 1 0 and  j β  is the j
th parameter 
associated to the independent variable xj.  
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Thus, the logarithm of the likelihood function to be maximized in β for the 
logistic regression parameters estimation can be written as 
() () [] ∑
=





i e x y
0
1 ln
β β β  , where  () β   is the likelihood function. 
3.2.1  Parameters Estimation and Model Evaluation 
The sample used to estimate the parameters of the logistic regression model is 
limited to collateralized and uncollateralized credits, filtered as described, from CIS 
database on June 30, 2005. The choice of this date is related to the fact that the 
independent variables were constructed based on borrowers information from twelve 
months before the selected date and our database had been filled with information since 
June 30 2004. The description of selected variables is found on appendix. 
The sample was divided into two parts: 70% to model estimation (93.284 
operations) and 30% to evaluate and adjust the model (40.071 operations). This 
separation was controlled by dummy of collateral, dummy of default and credit’s 
modality, aiming to ensure similarity between samples. The estimations were calculated 
using Stata 9.2. 
At the beginning, 25 independent variables have been selected and they were all 
used in model (1). The categorical variables have been substituted by dummies, and in 
the presence of multicollinearity, variables were eliminated. 
On model (2), it was used stepwise method to select variables, where 23 
variables were identified as statistically significant. 
On models (3) and (4), interations were introduced to evaluate the effects 
between collateral x credit modality (model 3) and collateral x worst borrower 
classification at the financial system (model 4). The idea of introducing interations of 
collateral with other variables is to evaluate if the effect of collateral on outcome 
variable is uniform for any value of the other variables. For these models, the estimation 
was realized using stepwise method.  
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Table 4 – Logistic Regression Models to Default Probability, June 30, 2005.  
Model (1) includes all selected independent variables; model (2) includes independent variables 
selected by stepwise method; model (3) includes interaction effect between collateral and credit modality 
and model (4) includes interaction effect between collateral and worst borrower class on financial system. 
Significance level: 5%.  
Model  Observations Log  likelihood  Hosmer-
Lemeshow chi
2(8)  Prob > chi
2  Area under ROC 
curve 
1 93284  -15517.9  15.33  0.0531  0.8578 
2 93284  -15529.1  14.68  0.0657  0.8577 
3 93284  -15461.1  15.56  0.0490  0.8595 
4 93284  -15535.6  12.31  0.1380  0.8572 
 
Table 4 shows the tests results of the models estimation. Using 
Hosmer-Lemeshow statistics as selection criteria, we chose model 4 as the best fitted 
model. Table 5 shows model 4 estimation results. We can observe that, for this model, 
only 21 variables were statistically significant. 
Table 5 – Logistic Regression Models for Probability of Default, including 
interaction effect between collateral and worst borrower class on financial system, 
June 30, 2005. 
Parameter  Coeficient  Standard 
Error 
Wald Chi-
Square  Pr > ChiSq  Odds 
Ratio 
Intercept  -1.3173  0.2062  -6.39  0.0000   
Classification in Jun/2005 A  -0.5610  0.0888  -6.32  0.0000  0.5706 
Classification in Jun/2005 B  0.4621  0.0487  9.48  0.0000  1.5873 
Classification in Jun/2005 C  0.7299  0.0493  14.80  0.0000  2.0749 
Classification in Jun/2005 D  1.7560  0.0610  28.77  0.0000  5.7895 
Dummy of Delay in Financial Institution  0.7849  0.0486  16.15  0.0000  2.1922 
Dummy of Delay in Brazilian Financial System  0.8998  0.0508  17.72  0.0000  2.4591 
Dummy of Increase in Financial Institution   0.1415  0.0358  3.95  0.0000  1.1520 
Dummy of Collateral   -0.3575  0.0390  -9.16  0.0000  0.6994 
Dummy of Default 12 Months in Financial 
Institution  0.8826  0.0956  9.23  0.0000  2.4173 
Dummy of Write Off in Financial Institution   0.2044  0.0723  2.83  0.0050  1.2267 
Dummy of Write Off in Brazilian Financial 
System  0.4760  0.0495  9.62  0.0000  1.6096 
Exposure in Brazilian Financial System   -0.3819  0.0182  -20.96  0.0000  0.6826 
Proportion of Debt in Financial Institution   -1.0225  0.0976  -10.48  0.0000  0.3597 
Interaction Dummy of Collateral x Worst 
Borrower Classification in Limited Brazilian 
Financial System H 
0.4314  0.1310  3.29  0.0010  1.5393 
Modality Consumer Loans  0.4210  0.0897  4.69  0.0000  1.5235 
Modality Working Capital Credits  0.5529  0.0441  12.53  0.0000  1.7383 
Modality Other Credits  -0.5609  0.1655  -3.39  0.0010  0.5707 
Modality Other Loans  0.3547  0.0621  5.71  0.0000  1.4257 
Modality Other Financing  0.3446  0.1085  3.18  0.0010  1.4115 
Worst Classification in Financial Institution E  -0.3943  0.1586  -2.49  0.0130  0.6741 
Worst Classification in Financial Institution HH  2.6303  1.2929  2.03  0.0420  13.8777 
Worst Classification in Financial Institution in  0.1871  0.0439  4.27  0.0000  1.2057  
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Parameter  Coeficient  Standard 
Error 
Wald Chi-
Square  Pr > ChiSq  Odds 
Ratio 
Limited Brazilian Financial System C 
Worst Classification in Financial Institution in 
Limited Brazilian Financial System D  0.4499  0.0504  8.92  0.0000  1.5682 
Worst Classification in Financial Institution in 
Limited Brazilian Financial System E  0.4784  0.0919  5.21  0.0000  1.6135 
Worst Classification in Financial Institution in 
Limited Brazilian Financial System F  0.6650  0.1075  6.19  0.0000  1.9445 
Worst Classification in Financial Institution in 
Limited Brazilian Financial System G  0.4594  0.1069  4.30  0.0000  1.5831 
Expiration Period   0.0009  0.0000  21.06  0.0000  1.0009 
Relationship Period   -0.0001  0.0000  -10.98  0.0000  0.9999 
Proportion of Delay in Financial Institution  -0.5157  0.1052  -4.90  0.0000  0.5971 
Proportion of Delay in Brazilian Financial 
System  2.2348  0.1438  15.54  0.0000  9.3442 
Number of Lenders   0.0428  0.0059  7.25  0.0000  1.0438 
Total Debt   0.1440  0.0166  8.70  0.0000  1.1549 
Effective Interest Rate of Operation  0.0047  0.0004  12.13  0.0000  1.0047 
 
In general, the independent variables presented coefficient signal as expected. 
The variable credit classification in Jun/2005 showed
16 the expected behavior: as credit 
classification gets worst, its probability of default is higher. This can be verified through 
increasing odds ratio, in the way that, credits classified as D have six more chances to 
default than credits classified in the range AA to C. The variable worst classification in 
limited Brazilian financial
17 system had similar behavior. 
According to the model, it should be observed that a borrower who, in any of the 
twelve months before Jun/2005, had any loan write-off (classification HH) in a financial 
institution has fourteen more chances to default in the same institution than a borrower 
out of this situation. 
In respect to credits modalities, the model shows uniform behavior, with odds 
ratio greater than unit, except to the modality denominated other credits, which has odds 
ratio of 0.57, meaning that the chance of a credit default in this modality is reduced in 
43% compared to a credit in a different modality. 
About the variable of interest, dummy of collateral, it is noticed a negative 
coefficient, with an odds ratio lower than one (0,70), meaning that the chance of default 
is smaller in the presence of collateral, which corroborates the results found in earlier 
                                               
16 In the logistic regression, the categorical variable was transformed into a dummy variable, where the 
AA classification was considered as the basal level. 
17 This variable shows the information about the worst classification of the borrower in the system 
considering the last twelve months before Jun 30, 2006, limited to the sample used in this article.  
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section. In a general sense, collateralized operations have their chance of default 
lowered by 30% when compared to uncollateralized operations. 
The model with the crossed effect introduced by the interaction between 
collateral and borrower’s worst classification in Brazilian financial system suggests that, 
to classification H, the interaction’s coefficient is significant; which means that 
collateral is relevant in the situation immediately before the write-off. In that case, the 
association between risk factor and outcome variable depends, in some way, on the 
co-variable level. This interaction has an odds ratio of 1.54 and to its interpretation, 
according to Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000), it is necessary to decompose the cross 
effect – the impact grade of collateral on probability of default depends if the borrower 
was classified as H among any financial institution along the year before. The odds ratio 
of collateral, considering that the borrower had a different classification in financial 
system along the last 12 months, is 0.47. On the other side, the odds ratio of collateral, 
considering that the borrower was classified as H along the last 12 months, is 0.72. This 
means that the collateral has a mitigation effect over the chance of default of operations 
whose borrowers have not been classified as H in the system in a greater grade (it 
reduces the chance of default by 53% if compared to uncollateralized operations) than 
borrowers classified as H in the system (reduction of chance of default by 27%). 
The elected logistic model (model 4) was applied over the second part of the 
sample (test sample), which corresponded to 30% of total observations (40.071 
operations). In this case, the area under the ROC curve was 0.8577, which represents an 
excellent discrimination power of the model.  
Table 6 shows the average of the estimated PDs for each risk classification, as 
well as the results of the test about difference between collateralized and 
uncollateralized  PDs. The test results corroborate the hypothesis that PDs behave 
differently in the presence of collateral.  
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Table 6 – Test of Hypothesis about difference between collateralized and 
uncollateralized PDs obtained for each risk class.  
H0: Collateralized PD - Uncollateralized PD = 0 
H1: Collateralized PD - Uncollateralized PD < 0 
  Significance level of 5%   





between PDs  Test Statistic  Result 
AA 0.79%  1.27% -0.48%  -7.5363  Rejects  H0 
A 2.06% 3.46% -1.39%  -18.6137  Rejects  H0 
B 3.69% 6.64%  -2.95%  -21.4243  Rejects  H0 
C 6.83% 9.54%  -2.72%  -13.1658  Rejects  H0 
D 34.43% 37.16%  -2.73%  -2.3281  Rejects  H0 
Average PD  4.30% 6.98%  -2.67%  -26.0184  Rejects  H0 
 
3.3.  Capital Charge Calculation 
Capital Charge was calculated on the basis of June 30, 2006 data. Calculation of 
CC and the equivalence factor of the operations in each group can be monitored through 
Tables 7 and 8 below. In Tables 7a and 8a, capital requirement K of the IRB Foundation 
Approach was presented for each risk class. The value of K was calculated on the basis 
of average PD estimates of the two periods considered (Average PD) in the EAD 
amounts obtained, with an LGD of 45% and M of 2.5 years, as determined in the Basel 
II Accord. Risk weighted assets (RWA), expected losses (PD x LGD), capital charge 
(CC) and, finally, Total CC, defined as the sum of expected (PD x LGD) and 
unexpected losses (K) applied to EAD, were also presented. 
 
Table 7a – Calculation of capital charge for uncollateralized operations according to 
the IRB-Foundation Approach  
IRB – Foundation 


















AA   16,264,170.94    7.69   11,368,011.99   0.50   1,250,481.32    82,087.70    1,332,569.02  
A   12,803,355.23   10.93   12,721,903.83   1.68   1,399,409.42    214,579.89    1,613,989.31  
B   8,169,984.74   12.85   9,547,154.33   2.75   1,050,186.98    224,715.04    1,274,902.02  
C   3,574,562.55   15.14   4,920,615.47   4.27   541,267.70    152,463.44    693,731.14  
D   736,297.86   19.61   1,312,624.76   16.25   144,388.72    119,645.45    264,034.17  
E   284,969.60    - -  45.00  -   128,236.32    128,236.32 
F   304,675.53    - -  45.00  -   137,103.99    137,103.99 
G   232,980.68    - -  45.00  -   104,841.31    104,841.31 
H   993,749.24    - -  45.00  -   447,187.16    447,187.16 
Total   43,364,746.37     39,870,541.41     4,385,759.56   1,610,860.29    5,996,619.85  
                                               




Table 7b – Calculation of the capital charge for uncollateralized operations according 
to the Standardized Simplified Approach  
Standardized Simplified Approach 










AA   16,264,170.94   0.00   1,789,058.80   -   1,789,058.80   
A   12,739,338.46   0.50   1,401,327.23   64,016.78    1,465,344.01  
B   8,088,284.89    1.00   889,711.34   81,699.85    971,411.19  
C   3,467,325.67    3.00   381,405.82   107,236.88    488,642.70  
D   662,668.07   10.00   72,893.49   73,629.79    146,523.27  
E   199,478.72   30.00   21,942.66   85,490.88    107,433.54  
F   152,337.77   50.00   16,757.15   152,337.77    169,094.92  
G   69,894.20   70.00   7,688.36   163,086.48    170,774.84  
H -  100.00  0.00   993,749.24    993,749.24 
Total   41,643,498.73       4,580,784.86   1,721,247.65    6,302,032.51 
 
Tables 7b and 8b show provision levels according to Resolution 2,682/99 for 
each risk category, as well as the respective CCs, according to the SSA. 
 
Table 8a – Calculation of capital charge for collateralized operations according to the 
IRB Foundation Approach.  
IRB Foundation 

















AA   6.384.821.69    6.29   3.649.973.31   0.30   401.497.06    18.983.39    420.480.46  
A   5,710,519.23    7.45   3,867,943.81   0.46   425,473.82    26,338.71    451,812.53  
B   3,115,221.33    8.97   2,539,350.36   0.83   279,328.54    25,722.31    305,050.85  
C   2,181,535.85   11.22   2,224,879.12   1.83   244,736.70    39,873.81    284,610.51  
D   487,358.25   18.36   813,368.78   7.66   89,470.57    37,331.51    126,802.08  
E   167,497.66    -  - 45.00  -   75,373.95     75,373.95  
F   58,744.76    -  - 45.00  -   26,435.14     26,435.14  
G   50,836.18    -  - 45.00  -   22,876.28     22,876.28  
H   428,461.74    -  - 45.00  -   192,807.78     192,807.78  




Table 8b – Calculation of capital charge for collateralized operations according to the 
Standardized Simplified Approach  
Standardized Simplified Approach 










AA   6,384,821.69    0.00   702,330.39   -   702,330.39   
A   5,681,966.63    0.50  625,026.33   28,552.60    653,568.93  
B   3,084,069.12    1.00   339,247.60    31,152.21    370,399.82  
C   2,116,089.77    3.00   232,769.88    65,446.08    298,215.95  
D   438,622.42    10.00   48,248.47    48,735.82    96,984.29  
E   117,248.36    30.00   12,897.32    50,249.30    63,146.62  
F   29,372.38    50.00   3,230.96    29,372.38    32,603.34  
G   15,250.85    70.00   1,677.59    35,585.32    37,262.92  
H -  100.00  -   428,461.74     428,461.74  
Total   17,867,441.24       1,965,418.54    717,555.45    2,682,973.99  
 
The equivalence factor of 93% for the group of uncollateralized operations was 
obtained through equation (10). This is the factor that would make total CC calculated 
by the SSA equal to that calculated by the IRB Foundation Approach for the group of 
uncollateralized operations in the selected modalities. It should be stressed that the 
weighting factor is 100% in the SSA. The equivalence factor of 60.48% for the group of 
collateralized operations was obtained in the same way as the group of uncollateralized 
operations. 
These two results must be observed with caution, considering that the LGD of 
45% in the IRB Foundation Approach could be deemed highly optimistic for the 
Brazilian market. 
Another parameter deserves attention, the maturity. Although, Basel II suggests 
the value of 2.5 years, in Brazil many banks maintain portfolios with operations of less 
than one year. In order to identify the sensitivity of the capital requirement (K) to the 
variation of M value for both collateralized and uncollateralized operations, a simulation 
was carried out with the variation of six months in the parameter. An increase of six 
months in the maturity leads to a linear increase in percentage points of the capital 
requirement (K) calculated according to the IRB Foundation Approach. Table 9 presents 
the results of this sensitivity according to risk classification.   
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Table 9 – Sensitivity of the Capital Requirement 
(K) calculated according to the IRB Foundation 








AA 0.511%  0.487% 
A 0.488%  0.508% 
B 0.474%  0.511% 
C 0.464%  0.485% 
D 0.298%  0.426% 
E 0.000%  0.000% 
F 0.000%  0.000% 
G 0.000%  0.000% 
H 0.000%  0.000% 
*an increase of six months on maturity leads to an increase of 
the capital charge 
The results show that the sensitivity is different among risk classifications due to 
the term of maturity adjustment (b in equation 6), which is dependent on the PD. In 
general, the sensitivity is higher among collateralized operations than among 
uncollateralized operations as maturity adjustment is higher for lower PDs. In other 
words, for a one-year portfolio, capital requirement would decrease, on average, by 1.5 
percentage points in each risk classification among collateralized operations. Using the 
basis of June 30, 2006 data, this would mean a decrease of 14% on total Capital Charge. 
Considering uncollateralized operations, for a one-year portfolio, capital 
requirement would decrease, on average, by 1.45 percentage points in each risk 
classification, which would mean a decrease of 10% on total Capital Charge 
As mentioned in the section on Methodology, the impact of the use of the 
collateral mitigator on the CC of National Financial System institutions was evaluated 
in two different ways: variation of total CC between the group of uncollateralized 
operations and the group of collateralized operations and variation of the equivalence 
factor between the same groups of operations. The total CC of the group of 
uncollateralized operations represented 13.82% of the respective EAD, while the 
percentage was 10.26% in the case of the collateralized group. The equivalence factor 
was 93.33% in the first group and 60.48% in the second, utilizing an LGD of 45%. In 
this way, the effect was to reduce the capital required to cover credit risk in both 
assessments of the impact of the mitigation.   
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4.  Conclusion 
This paper had the objective of evaluating the impact of the collateral mitigation 
on National Financial System capital charges by measuring probability of default. In 
doing so, it compared the capital charge of the Standardized Simplified Approach with 
that obtained through the IRB Foundation Approach, in which estimates of the 
probability of default were obtained on the basis of two-year data for a specific segment 
of nonretail operations drawn from the Credit Information System. The study 
demonstrated that the probabilities of default were low in the segment of collateralized 
operations. This result was obtained from historical average probability of default 
methodology and was confirmed by the logistic regression model approach. 
As a result, capital charges decreased. The results further indicated that the 
equivalent weighting factor between total capital charges of the Standardized Simplified 
Approach and the IRB Foundation Approach would be 93% for uncollateralized 
operations and 60% for collateralized operations. With regard to uncollateralized 
operations, the factor found was quite close to the 100% factor utilized in Central Bank 
of Brazil legislation on the Standardized Simplified Approach. On the other hand, the 
value encountered revealed a certain conservative bias for the grouping of collateralized 
operations, a characteristic considered inherent to preventive regulation. 
Though this paper has not evaluated the quality and the value of the collateral, 
this preliminary result does represent an incentive for institutions to migrate to the IRB 
Foundation Approach, through adoption of an effective credit risk management model 
and an adequate monitoring of collateral, with the consequent possibility of reducing 
capital charges on their operations. One should underscore that these results were 
obtained on the basis of the 11% capital charge standard adopted by Brazil and Loss 
Given Default set at 45%, as suggested by Basel II for the IRB Foundation Approach. 
This study restricted itself to comparing uncollateralized operations with 
collateralized operations. Future studies should encompass other mitigators, as well as 
include the retail banking book. A study on estimating Loss Given Default, as an 
alternative to the fixed percentage of 45% suggested by Basel II, would also be 
recommended.   
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Description of the explanatory variables used in the logistic regression model 
Classification in Jun/2005 –categorical variable that represents the risk classification 
attributed by the financial institution to each operation at the base-date: AA, A, B, C, D. 
In the regression model, dummies were used to indicate each risk class. 
Dummy of Delay in Financial Institution – The variable assumes 1 if the borrower 
possesses past due credits or write-offs in the financial institution at the base-date and 
assumes 0 otherwise. 
Dummy of Delay in Brazilian Financial System – The variable assumes 1 if the 
borrower possesses past due credits or write-offs in the financial system at the base-date 
and assumes 0 otherwise. 
Dummy of Increase in Financial Institution – The variable assumes 1 if the borrower’ 
total debt in the financial institution in Jun/2005 (base-date) is larger than its total debt 
in Jun/2004. The variable assumes 0 otherwise. 
Dummy of Collateral - The variable assumes 1 if the operation is collateralized and 
assumes 0 otherwise. 
Dummy of Default 12 Months in Financial Institution - The variable assumes 1 if the 
borrower is classified from E to HH in any of the 12 months before the base-date. The 
variable assumes 0 otherwise. 
Dummy of Write Off in Financial Institution – The variable assumes 1 if the 
proportion of past due credits and write-offs of the borrower in the financial institution 
in relation to its total debt, including write-offs, in the financial institution is larger than 
10%. The variable assumes 0 otherwise. 
Dummy of Write Off in Brazilian Financial System - The variable assumes 1 if the 
proportion of past due credits and write-offs of the borrower in the financial system in 
relation to its total debt, including write-offs, in the financial system is larger than 10%. 
The variable assumes 0 otherwise. 
Exposure in Brazilian Financial System – Logarithm of the borrower’ total debt in the 
financial system at the base-date. 
Proportion of Debt in Financial Institution – proportion of the borrower’ total debt in 
a specific operation within the financial institution in relation to borrower’ total debt in 
the financial institution. 
Modality - categorical variable that identifies the credit modalities of the operation. 
This variable was decomposed into dummies in the regression model. 
Worst Classification in Financial Institution – categorical variable that identifies the 
borrower’ worst risk classification in the financial institution along the 12 months  
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before the base-date. It varies from HH to AA. This variable was decomposed into 
dummies in the regression model. 
Worst Classification in Financial Institution in Limited Brazilian Financial 
System
19 - categorical variable that identifies the borrower’ worst risk classification in 
the Limited Brazilian Financial System along the 12 months before the base-date. It 
varies from HH to AA. This variable was decomposed into dummies in the regression 
model. 
Expiration Period – number of days between the base-date and the operation’ maturity 
date.  
Relationship Period - number of days between the base-date and the beginning of the 
relationship between the borrower and the financial institution. 
Proportion of Delay in Financial Institution – proportion of the past due credits and 
write-offs of the borrower in the financial institution in relation to borrower’ total debt 
in the financial institution. 
Proportion of Delay in Brazilian Financial System - proportion of the past due credits 
and write-offs of the borrower in the Brazilian financial system in relation to borrower’ 
total debt in the Brazilian financial system. 
Number of Lenders – quantity of financial institutions where the borrower possesses 
credit operations at the base-date. 
Total Debt - Logarithm of the total debt of the credit operation at the base-date.  
Effective Interest Rate of Operation – Annual interest rate of the credit operation. 
                                               
19 Limited Brazilian Financial System – it consists of a subset of all the operations registered on CIS in 
Jun/2005. This subset contains all the operations of the initial sample selected for this study, before the 
filters’ implementation.  
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Table A – Estimated default probabilities for all operations stratified according to 
modalities and risk classification 
Modality  Class 




































































AA  9,934  1.34%  3,482  1.78%  9,739  0.40%  10,377  0.61% 
A  17,794  4.19%  13,469 3.46% 4,785  3.62%  4,862  1.52% 
B  15,944  5.33%  19,229 5.71% 2,206  6.71%  1,858  4.25% 
C  13,766  6.88%  12,606 7.48% 4,340  4.56%  2,834  3.95% 
D  2,216  28.38%  2,306 36.51% 460  27.17%  406  22.91% 
E  675  0.00%  702 0.00% 236  0.00%  109  0.00% 
F  444  0.00%  390 0.00% 187  0.00%  133  0.00% 
G  431  0.00%  566 0.00% 97  0.00%  31  0.00% 
H  1,811  0.00%  1,879 0.00% 464  0.00%  228  0.00% 




















































AA  614  1.14%  740  2.43%  126  3.97%  126  0.79% 
A  2,146  3.96%  1,437 5.50% 874  3.09%  377  2.92% 
B  1,751  5.37%  1,455 7.56% 340  4.71%  188  6.91% 
C  1,298  13.79%  870 15.17% 573  9.77%  65  24.62% 
D  309  41.75%  280 34.64% 71  25.35%  15  33.33% 
E  120  0.00%  70 0.00% 15  0.00%  4  0.00% 
F  58  0.00%  79 0.00% 8  0.00%  63  0.00% 
G  48  0.00%  67 0.00% 10  0.00%  3  0.00% 
H  289  0.00%  385 0.00% 135  0.00%  28  0.00% 






























































AA  2,453  3.06%  1,644  3.28%  1,491  1.21%  1,798  1.11% 
A  9,692  3.76%  3,985 4.89% 12,367  1.03%  4,044  0.64% 
B  6,112  8.20%  5,722 8.81% 2,666  1.28%  2,867  0.73% 
C  5,806  9.47%  3,712 15.81% 6,333  4.71%  3,037  0.69% 
D  1,318  28.38%  822 37.96% 345  38.55%  139  28.78% 
E  447  0.00%  499 0.00% 120  0.00%  43  0.00% 
F  482  0.00%  454 0.00% 104  0.00%  27  0.00% 
G  283  0.00%  158 0.00% 103  0.00%  11  0.00% 
H  1,213  0.00%  868 0.00% 427  0.00%  201  0.00% 
Total  27,806     17,864     23,956   12,167    
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Modality  Class 










































AA  5,756  0.45%  6,152  0.26%  428  0.23%  242  0.83% 
A  1,462  3.56%  1,739 2.07% 578  2.60%  602  1.66% 
B  1,185  5.23%  1,193 6.37% 1,926  2.08%  290  3.45% 
C  848  27.71%  834 25.42% 530  31.89%  123  43.90% 
D  1,388  44.67%  748 48.40% 812  39.04%  226  26.99% 
E  493  0.00%  428 0.00% 243  0.00%  42  0.00% 
F  447  0.00%  340 0.00% 201  0.00%  32  0.00% 
G  293  0.00%  185 0.00% 118  0.00%  16  0.00% 
H  2,647  0.00%  1,818 0.00% 1,150  0.00%  180  0.00% 






























AA  163  0.61%  280  1.79%  415  2.89%  356  2.53% 
A  1,780  3.09%  319 5.33% 1,542  4.22%  340  4.71% 
B  795  5.66%  84 5.95% 1,152  5.03%  96  5.21% 
C  1,692  5.79%  174 6.32% 1,424  6.53%  38  21.05% 
D  94  32.98%  27 55.56% 98  45.92%  23  30.43% 
E  39  0.00%  11 0.00% 43  0.00%  7  0.00% 
F  21  0.00%  11 0.00% 38  0.00%  7  0.00% 
G  35  0.00%  6 0.00% 19  0.00%  1  0.00% 
H  139  0.00%  38 0.00% 113  0.00%  6  0.00% 

















AA  1,391  0.29%  1,942  0.21%  154  0.00%  140  0.00% 
A  3,046  2.56%  2,497 3.32% 12,401  0.10%  9,334  0.05% 
B  475  4.00%  744 4.57% 5,919  0.19%  5,541  0.27% 
C  211  14.69%  258 21.71% 2,210  0.36%  2,625  0.50% 
D  102  43.14%  167 35.33% 1,490  2.01%  1,133  3.97% 
E  38  0.00%  64 0.00% 12  0.00%  6  0.00% 
F  32  0.00%  46 0.00% 10  0.00%  7  0.00% 
G  10  0.00%  33 0.00% 2  0.00%  4  0.00% 
H  203  0.00%  386 0.00% 51  0.00%  69  0.00% 

















  AA  1,023  0.88%  1,120  0.18%  324  0.00%  306  0.00% 
A  894  0.89%  781 0.13% 176  0.00%  118  0.00%  
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Modality  Class 






























B  736  2.17%  620 0.48% 58  0.00%  34  0.00% 
C  494  4.45%  292 1.71% 72  0.00%  61  3.28% 
D  120  19.17%  40 2.50% 11  18.18%  5  0.00% 
E  22  0.00%  2 0.00% 8  0.00%  5  0.00% 
F  15  0.00%  20 0.00% 4  0.00%  4  0.00% 
G  6  0.00%  6 0.00% 5  0.00%  0  0.00% 
H  80  0.00%  38 0.00% 11  0.00%  9  0.00% 





























































AA  68  0.00%  40  2.50%  60  3.33%  39  5.13% 
A  296  3.72%  192 11.46% 229  4.37%  234  2.99% 
B  188  6.91%  153 13.73% 196  9.18%  232  6.47% 
C  274  10.95%  148 10.14% 77  14.29%  135  15.56% 
D  127  45.67%  103 44.66% 181  22.10%  153  22.22% 
E  26  0.00%  20 0.00% 22  0.00%  21  0.00% 
F  7  0.00%  6 0.00% 5  0.00%  6  0.00% 
G  11  0.00%  5 0.00% 8  0.00%  8  0.00% 
H  146  0.00%  169 0.00% 55  0.00%  45  0.00% 
Total  1,143     836   833   873   
Total das 
Operações 




Banco Central do Brasil 
 
 
Trabalhos para Discussão 
Os Trabalhos para Discussão podem ser acessados na internet, no formato PDF, 
no endereço: http://www.bc.gov.br 
 
Working Paper Series 





1  Implementing Inflation Targeting in Brazil 




2  Política Monetária e Supervisão do Sistema Financeiro Nacional no 
Banco Central do Brasil 
Eduardo Lundberg 
 









3  Private Sector Participation: a Theoretical Justification of the Brazilian 
Position 
Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa Werlang 
 
Jul/2000 
4  An Information Theory Approach to the Aggregation of Log-Linear 
Models 
Pedro H. Albuquerque 
 
Jul/2000 
5  The Pass-Through from Depreciation to Inflation: a Panel Study 
Ilan Goldfajn and  Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa Werlang 
 
Jul/2000 
6  Optimal Interest Rate Rules in Inflation Targeting Frameworks 
José Alvaro Rodrigues Neto, Fabio Araújo and Marta Baltar J. Moreira 
 
Jul/2000 




8  The Correlation Matrix of the Brazilian Central Bank’s Standard Model 
for Interest Rate Market Risk 
José Alvaro Rodrigues Neto 
 
Sep/2000 




10  Análise do Financiamento Externo a uma Pequena Economia 
Aplicação da Teoria do Prêmio Monetário ao Caso Brasileiro: 1991–1998 
Carlos Hamilton Vasconcelos Araújo e Renato Galvão Flôres Júnior 
 
Mar/2001 
11  A Note on the Efficient Estimation of Inflation in Brazil 
Michael F. Bryan and Stephen G. Cecchetti 
 
Mar/2001 
12  A Test of Competition in Brazilian Banking 




13  Modelos de Previsão de Insolvência Bancária no Brasil 
Marcio Magalhães Janot 
 
Mar/2001 
14  Evaluating Core Inflation Measures for Brazil 
Francisco Marcos Rodrigues Figueiredo 
 
Mar/2001 
15  Is It Worth Tracking Dollar/Real Implied Volatility? 
Sandro Canesso de Andrade and Benjamin Miranda Tabak 
 
Mar/2001 
16  Avaliação das Projeções do Modelo Estrutural do Banco Central do 
Brasil para a Taxa de Variação do IPCA 
Sergio Afonso Lago Alves 
 
Evaluation of the Central Bank of Brazil Structural Model’s Inflation 
Forecasts in an Inflation Targeting Framework 









17  Estimando o Produto Potencial Brasileiro: uma Abordagem de Função 
de Produção 
Tito Nícias Teixeira da Silva Filho 
 
Estimating Brazilian Potential Output: a Production Function Approach 







18  A Simple Model for Inflation Targeting in Brazil 
Paulo Springer de Freitas and Marcelo Kfoury Muinhos 
 
Apr/2001 
19  Uncovered Interest Parity with Fundamentals: a Brazilian Exchange 
Rate Forecast Model 
Marcelo Kfoury Muinhos, Paulo Springer de Freitas and Fabio Araújo 
 
May/2001 
20  Credit Channel without the LM Curve 
Victorio Y. T. Chu and Márcio I. Nakane 
 
May/2001 
21  Os Impactos Econômicos da CPMF: Teoria e Evidência 
Pedro H. Albuquerque 
 
Jun/2001 
22 Decentralized  Portfolio  Management 
Paulo Coutinho and Benjamin Miranda Tabak 
 
Jun/2001 
23  Os Efeitos da CPMF sobre a Intermediação Financeira 
Sérgio Mikio Koyama e Márcio I. Nakane 
 
Jul/2001 
24  Inflation Targeting in Brazil: Shocks, Backward-Looking Prices, and 
IMF Conditionality 
Joel Bogdanski, Paulo Springer de Freitas, Ilan Goldfajn and 
Alexandre Antonio Tombini 
 
Aug/2001 





26  Inflation Targeting in an Open Financially Integrated Emerging 
Economy: the Case of Brazil 





Complementaridade e Fungibilidade dos Fluxos de Capitais 
Internacionais 






Regras Monetárias e Dinâmica Macroeconômica no Brasil: uma 
Abordagem de Expectativas Racionais 
Marco Antonio Bonomo e Ricardo D. Brito 
 
Nov/2001 
29  Using a Money Demand Model to Evaluate Monetary Policies in Brazil 
Pedro H. Albuquerque and Solange Gouvêa 
 
Nov/2001 
30  Testing the Expectations Hypothesis in the Brazilian Term Structure of 
Interest Rates 
Benjamin Miranda Tabak and Sandro Canesso de Andrade 
 
Nov/2001 
31  Algumas Considerações sobre a Sazonalidade no IPCA 
Francisco Marcos R. Figueiredo e Roberta Blass Staub 
 
Nov/2001 
32  Crises Cambiais e Ataques Especulativos no Brasil 
Mauro Costa Miranda 
 
Nov/2001 




34  Constrained Discretion and Collective Action Problems: Reflections on 
the Resolution of International Financial Crises 
Arminio Fraga and Daniel Luiz Gleizer 
 
Nov/2001 
35  Uma Definição Operacional de Estabilidade de Preços 
Tito Nícias Teixeira da Silva Filho 
 
Dez/2001 




37  Monetary Policy in Brazil: Remarks on the Inflation Targeting Regime, 
Public Debt Management and Open Market Operations 
Luiz Fernando Figueiredo, Pedro Fachada and Sérgio Goldenstein 
 
Mar/2002 
38  Volatilidade Implícita e Antecipação de Eventos de Stress: um Teste para 
o Mercado Brasileiro 
Frederico Pechir Gomes 
 
Mar/2002 
39  Opções sobre Dólar Comercial e Expectativas a Respeito do 
Comportamento da Taxa de Câmbio 
Paulo Castor de Castro 
 
Mar/2002 
40  Speculative Attacks on Debts, Dollarization and Optimum Currency 
Areas 
Aloisio Araujo and Márcia Leon 
 
Apr/2002 
41  Mudanças de Regime no Câmbio Brasileiro 
Carlos Hamilton V. Araújo e Getúlio B. da Silveira Filho 
 
Jun/2002 
42  Modelo Estrutural com Setor Externo: Endogenização do Prêmio de 
Risco e do Câmbio 
Marcelo Kfoury Muinhos, Sérgio Afonso Lago Alves e Gil Riella 
 
Jun/2002 
43  The Effects of the Brazilian ADRs Program on Domestic Market 
Efficiency 




44  Estrutura Competitiva, Produtividade Industrial e Liberação Comercial 
no Brasil 
Pedro Cavalcanti Ferreira e Osmani Teixeira de Carvalho Guillén 
 
Jun/2002 





46  The Determinants of Bank Interest Spread in Brazil 
Tarsila Segalla Afanasieff, Priscilla Maria Villa Lhacer and Márcio I. Nakane 
 
Aug/2002 
47  Indicadores Derivados de Agregados Monetários  
Fernando de Aquino Fonseca Neto e José Albuquerque Júnior 
 
Set/2002 
48  Should Government Smooth Exchange Rate Risk? 
Ilan Goldfajn and Marcos Antonio Silveira 
 
Sep/2002 
49  Desenvolvimento do Sistema Financeiro e Crescimento Econômico no 
Brasil: Evidências de Causalidade 
Orlando Carneiro de Matos 
 
Set/2002 
50  Macroeconomic Coordination and Inflation Targeting in a Two-Country 
Model 
Eui Jung Chang, Marcelo Kfoury Muinhos and Joanílio Rodolpho Teixeira 
 
Sep/2002 
51  Credit Channel with Sovereign Credit Risk: an Empirical Test 
Victorio Yi Tson Chu 
 
Sep/2002 
52  Generalized Hyperbolic Distributions and Brazilian Data 
José Fajardo and Aquiles Farias 
 
Sep/2002 
53  Inflation Targeting in Brazil: Lessons and Challenges 
André Minella, Paulo Springer de Freitas, Ilan Goldfajn and 
Marcelo Kfoury Muinhos 
 
Nov/2002 
54  Stock Returns and Volatility 
Benjamin Miranda Tabak and Solange Maria Guerra 
 
Nov/2002 
55  Componentes de Curto e Longo Prazo das Taxas de Juros no Brasil 




56  Causality and Cointegration in Stock Markets: 
the Case of Latin America 
Benjamin Miranda Tabak and Eduardo José Araújo Lima 
 
Dec/2002 




58  The Random Walk Hypothesis and the Behavior of Foreign Capital 
Portfolio Flows: the Brazilian Stock Market Case 
Benjamin Miranda Tabak 
 
Dec/2002 
59  Os Preços Administrados e a Inflação no Brasil 
Francisco Marcos R. Figueiredo e Thaís Porto Ferreira 
 
Dez/2002 
60 Delegated  Portfolio  Management 




61  O Uso de Dados de Alta Freqüência na Estimação da Volatilidade e 
do Valor em Risco para o Ibovespa  
João Maurício de Souza Moreira e Eduardo Facó Lemgruber 
 
Dez/2002 
62  Taxa de Juros e Concentração Bancária no Brasil 
Eduardo Kiyoshi Tonooka e Sérgio Mikio Koyama 
 
Fev/2003 
63  Optimal Monetary Rules: the Case of Brazil 
Charles Lima de Almeida, Marco Aurélio Peres, Geraldo da Silva e Souza 
and Benjamin Miranda Tabak 
 
Feb/2003 
64  Medium-Size Macroeconomic Model for the Brazilian Economy 
Marcelo Kfoury Muinhos and Sergio Afonso Lago Alves 
 
Feb/2003 
65  On the Information Content of Oil Future Prices 
Benjamin Miranda Tabak 
 
Feb/2003 
66  A Taxa de Juros de Equilíbrio: uma Abordagem Múltipla 
Pedro Calhman de Miranda e Marcelo Kfoury Muinhos 
 
Fev/2003 
67  Avaliação de Métodos de Cálculo de Exigência de Capital para Risco de 
Mercado de Carteiras de Ações no Brasil 




68  Real Balances in the Utility Function: Evidence for Brazil 
Leonardo Soriano de Alencar and Márcio I. Nakane 
 
Feb/2003 
69  r-filters: a Hodrick-Prescott Filter Generalization 
Fabio Araújo, Marta Baltar Moreira Areosa and José Alvaro Rodrigues Neto 
 
Feb/2003 
70  Monetary Policy Surprises and the Brazilian Term Structure of Interest 
Rates 
Benjamin Miranda Tabak 
 
Feb/2003 





72  O Prêmio pela Maturidade na Estrutura a Termo das Taxas de Juros 
Brasileiras 
Ricardo Dias de Oliveira Brito, Angelo J. Mont'Alverne Duarte e Osmani 
Teixeira de C. Guillen 
 
Maio/2003 
73  Análise de Componentes Principais de Dados Funcionais – uma 
Aplicação às Estruturas a Termo de Taxas de Juros 
Getúlio Borges da Silveira e Octavio Bessada 
 
Maio/2003 
74  Aplicação do Modelo de Black, Derman & Toy à Precificação de Opções 
Sobre Títulos de Renda Fixa  




75  Brazil’s Financial System: Resilience to Shocks, no Currency 
Substitution, but Struggling to Promote Growth 
Ilan Goldfajn, Katherine Hennings and Helio Mori 
 
Jun/2003 
     
  40
76  Inflation Targeting in Emerging Market Economies 
Arminio Fraga, Ilan Goldfajn and André Minella 
 
Jun/2003 
77  Inflation Targeting in Brazil: Constructing Credibility under Exchange 
Rate Volatility 




78  Contornando os Pressupostos de Black & Scholes: Aplicação do Modelo 
de Precificação de Opções de Duan no Mercado Brasileiro 
Gustavo Silva Araújo, Claudio Henrique da Silveira Barbedo, Antonio 
Carlos Figueiredo, Eduardo Facó Lemgruber 
 
Out/2003 
79  Inclusão do Decaimento Temporal na Metodologia  
Delta-Gama para o Cálculo do VaR de Carteiras  
Compradas em Opções no Brasil 
Claudio Henrique da Silveira Barbedo, Gustavo Silva Araújo,  







80  Diferenças e Semelhanças entre Países da América Latina: 
uma Análise de Markov Switching para os Ciclos Econômicos 
de Brasil e Argentina 
Arnildo da Silva Correa 
 
Out/2003 
81  Bank Competition, Agency Costs and the Performance of the  
Monetary Policy 
Leonardo Soriano de Alencar and Márcio I. Nakane 
 
Jan/2004 
82  Carteiras de Opções: Avaliação de Metodologias de Exigência de Capital 
no Mercado Brasileiro 
Cláudio Henrique da Silveira Barbedo e Gustavo Silva Araújo 
 
Mar/2004 
83  Does Inflation Targeting Reduce Inflation? An Analysis for the OECD 
Industrial Countries 
Thomas Y. Wu 
 
May/2004 
84  Speculative Attacks on Debts and Optimum Currency Area: a Welfare 
Analysis 
Aloisio Araujo and Marcia Leon 
 
May/2004 
85  Risk Premia for Emerging Markets Bonds: Evidence from Brazilian 
Government Debt, 1996-2002 
André Soares Loureiro and Fernando de Holanda Barbosa 
 
May/2004 
86  Identificação do Fator Estocástico de Descontos e Algumas Implicações 
sobre Testes de Modelos de Consumo 
Fabio Araujo e João Victor Issler 
 
Maio/2004 
87  Mercado de Crédito: uma Análise Econométrica dos Volumes de Crédito 
Total e Habitacional no Brasil 
Ana Carla Abrão Costa 
 
Dez/2004 
88  Ciclos Internacionais de Negócios: uma Análise de Mudança de Regime 
Markoviano para Brasil, Argentina e Estados Unidos 
Arnildo da Silva Correa e Ronald Otto Hillbrecht 
 
Dez/2004 
89  O Mercado de Hedge Cambial no Brasil: Reação das Instituições 
Financeiras a Intervenções do Banco Central 




90  Bank Privatization and Productivity: Evidence for Brazil 
Márcio I. Nakane and Daniela B. Weintraub 
 
Dec/2004 
91  Credit Risk Measurement and the Regulation of Bank Capital and 
Provision Requirements in Brazil – a Corporate Analysis 
Ricardo Schechtman, Valéria Salomão Garcia, Sergio Mikio Koyama and 







Steady-State Analysis of an Open Economy General Equilibrium Model 
for Brazil 
Mirta Noemi Sataka Bugarin, Roberto de Goes Ellery Jr., Victor Gomes 
Silva, Marcelo Kfoury Muinhos 
 
Apr/2005 
93  Avaliação de Modelos de Cálculo de Exigência de Capital para Risco 
Cambial 
Claudio H. da S. Barbedo, Gustavo S. Araújo, João Maurício S. Moreira e 
Ricardo S. Maia Clemente 
 
Abr/2005 
94  Simulação Histórica Filtrada: Incorporação da Volatilidade ao Modelo 
Histórico de Cálculo de Risco para Ativos Não-Lineares 
Claudio Henrique da Silveira Barbedo, Gustavo Silva Araújo e Eduardo 
Facó Lemgruber  
 
Abr/2005 
95  Comment on Market Discipline and Monetary Policy by Carl Walsh 
Maurício S. Bugarin and Fábia A. de Carvalho 
 
Apr/2005 
96  O que É Estratégia: uma Abordagem Multiparadigmática para a 
Disciplina 
Anthero de Moraes Meirelles 
 
Ago/2005 
97  Finance and the Business Cycle: a Kalman Filter Approach with Markov 
Switching 
Ryan A. Compton and Jose Ricardo da Costa e Silva 
 
Aug/2005 
98  Capital Flows Cycle: Stylized Facts and Empirical Evidences for 
Emerging Market Economies 
Helio Mori e Marcelo Kfoury Muinhos 
 
Aug/2005 
99  Adequação das Medidas de Valor em Risco na Formulação da Exigência 
de Capital para Estratégias de Opções no Mercado Brasileiro 
Gustavo Silva Araújo, Claudio Henrique da Silveira Barbedo,e Eduardo 
Facó Lemgruber  
 
Set/2005 
100  Targets and Inflation Dynamics 
Sergio A. L. Alves and Waldyr D. Areosa 
 
Oct/2005 
101  Comparing Equilibrium Real Interest Rates: Different Approaches to 
Measure Brazilian Rates 
Marcelo Kfoury Muinhos and Márcio I. Nakane 
 
Mar/2006 
102  Judicial Risk and Credit Market Performance: Micro Evidence from 
Brazilian Payroll Loans 
Ana Carla A. Costa and João M. P. de Mello 
 
Apr/2006 
103  The Effect of Adverse Supply Shocks on Monetary Policy and Output 
Maria da Glória D. S. Araújo, Mirta Bugarin, Marcelo Kfoury Muinhos and 





104  Extração de Informação de Opções Cambiais no Brasil 
Eui Jung Chang e Benjamin Miranda Tabak 
 
Abr/2006 
105  Representing Roommate’s Preferences with Symmetric Utilities 
José Alvaro Rodrigues Neto 
 
Apr/2006 
106  Testing Nonlinearities Between Brazilian Exchange Rates and Inflation 
Volatilities 
Cristiane R. Albuquerque and Marcelo Portugal 
 
May/2006 
107  Demand for Bank Services and Market Power in Brazilian Banking 
Márcio I. Nakane, Leonardo S. Alencar and Fabio Kanczuk 
 
Jun/2006 
108  O Efeito da Consignação em Folha nas Taxas de Juros dos Empréstimos 
Pessoais 
Eduardo A. S. Rodrigues, Victorio Chu, Leonardo S. Alencar e Tony Takeda 
 
Jun/2006 
109  The Recent Brazilian Disinflation Process and Costs 




110  Fatores de Risco e o Spread Bancário no Brasil 
Fernando G. Bignotto e Eduardo Augusto de Souza Rodrigues 
 
Jul/2006 
111  Avaliação de Modelos de Exigência de Capital para Risco de Mercado do 
Cupom Cambial  
Alan Cosme Rodrigues da Silva, João Maurício de Souza Moreira e Myrian 
Beatriz Eiras das Neves 
 
Jul/2006 
112 Interdependence  and  Contagion: an Analysis of Information 
Transmission in Latin America's Stock Markets  
Angelo Marsiglia Fasolo 
 
Jul/2006 
113  Investigação da Memória de Longo Prazo da Taxa de Câmbio no Brasil 




114  The Inequality Channel of Monetary Transmission 




115  Myopic Loss Aversion and House-Money Effect Overseas: an 
Experimental Approach 
José L. B. Fernandes, Juan Ignacio Peña and Benjamin M. Tabak  
 
Sep/2006 
116  Out-Of-The-Money Monte Carlo Simulation Option Pricing: the Join 
Use of Importance Sampling and Descriptive Sampling 




117  An Analysis of Off-Site Supervision of Banks’ Profitability, Risk and 
Capital Adequacy: a Portfolio Simulation Approach Applied to Brazilian 
Banks 
Theodore M. Barnhill, Marcos R. Souto and Benjamin M. Tabak  
 
Sep/2006 
118  Contagion, Bankruptcy and Social Welfare Analysis in a Financial 
Economy with Risk Regulation Constraint 




119  A Central de Risco de Crédito no Brasil: uma Análise de Utilidade de 
Informação 
Ricardo Schechtman  
 
Out/2006 
120  Forecasting Interest Rates: an Application for Brazil 
Eduardo J. A. Lima, Felipe Luduvice and Benjamin M. Tabak 
 
Oct/2006 
121  The Role of Consumer’s Risk Aversion on Price Rigidity 
Sergio A. Lago Alves and Mirta N. S. Bugarin 
 
Nov/2006 
122  Nonlinear Mechanisms of the Exchange Rate Pass-Through: a Phillips 
Curve Model With Threshold for Brazil 
Arnildo da Silva Correa and André Minella 
 
Nov/2006 
123  A Neoclassical Analysis of the Brazilian “Lost-Decades” 
Flávia Mourão Graminho 
 
Nov/2006 
124  The Dynamic Relations between Stock Prices and Exchange Rates: 
Evidence for Brazil 
Benjamin M. Tabak 
 
Nov/2006 
125  Herding Behavior by Equity Foreign Investors on Emerging Markets 
Barbara Alemanni and José Renato Haas Ornelas 
 
Dec/2006 
126  Risk Premium: Insights over the Threshold 
José L. B. Fernandes, Augusto Hasman and Juan Ignacio Peña 
 
Dec/2006 
127  Uma Investigação Baseada em Reamostragem sobre Requerimentos de 
Capital para Risco de Crédito no Brasil  
Ricardo Schechtman  
 
Dec/2006 
128  Term Structure Movements Implicit in Option Prices 
Caio Ibsen R. Almeida and José Valentim M. Vicente 
Dec/2006 
129  Brazil: Taming Inflation Expectations  
Afonso S. Bevilaqua, Mário Mesquita and André Minella 
Jan/2007 
130  The Role of Banks in the Brazilian Interbank Market: Does Bank Type 
Matter? 
Daniel O. Cajueiro and Benjamin M. Tabak 
 
Jan/2007 
131  Long-Range Dependence in Exchange Rates: the Case of the European 
Monetary System  




132  Credit Risk Monte Carlo Simulation Using Simplified Creditmetrics’ 
Model: the Joint Use of Importance Sampling and Descriptive Sampling 
Jaqueline Terra Moura Marins and Eduardo Saliby 
  
Mar/2007 
133  A New Proposal for Collection and Generation of Information on 
Financial Institutions’ Risk: the Case of Derivatives 
Gilneu F. A. Vivan and Benjamin M. Tabak 
  
Mar/2007 
134  Amostragem Descritiva no Apreçamento de Opções Européias através 
de Simulação Monte Carlo: o Efeito da Dimensionalidade e da 
Probabilidade de Exercício no Ganho de Precisão 
Eduardo Saliby, Sergio Luiz Medeiros Proença de Gouvêa e Jaqueline Terra 




135  Evaluation of Default Risk for the Brazilian Banking Sector 
Marcelo Y. Takami and Benjamin M. Tabak 
 
May/2007 
136 Identifying  Volatility  Risk  Premium from Fixed Income Asian Options 
Caio Ibsen R. Almeida and José Valentim M. Vicente  
 
May/2007 
137  Monetary Policy Design under Competing Models of Inflation 
Persistence 
Solange Gouvea e Abhijit Sen Gupta 
 
May/2007 
138  Forecasting Exchange Rate Density Using Parametric Models:  
the Case of Brazil  
Marcos M. Abe, Eui J. Chang and Benjamin M. Tabak  
 
May/2007 
139  Selection of Optimal Lag Length inCointegrated VAR Models with 
Weak Form of Common Cyclical Features 
Carlos Enrique Carrasco Gutiérrez, Reinaldo Castro Souza and Osmani 




140  Inflation Targeting, Credibility and Confidence Crises 




141  Forecasting Bonds Yields in the Brazilian Fixed income Market 




142  Crises Análise da Coerência de Medidas de Risco no Mercado Brasileiro 
de Ações e Desenvolvimento de uma Metodologia Híbrida para o 
Expected Shortfall 
Alan Cosme Rodrigues da Silva, Eduardo Facó Lemgruber, José Alberto 









144  The Effect of Bid-Ask Prices on Brazilian Options Implied Volatility: a 
Case Study of Telemar Call Options 
Claudio Henrique da Silveira Barbedo and Eduardo Facó Lemgruber 
 
Oct/2007 
145  The Stability-Concentration Relationship in the Brazilian Banking 
System 
Benjamin Miranda Tabak, Solange Maria Guerra, Eduardo José Araújo 
Lima and Eui Jung Chang 
 
Oct/2007 
146  Movimentos da Estrutura a Termo e Critérios de Minimização do Erro 
de Previsão em um Modelo Paramétrico Exponencial 
Caio Almeida, Romeu Gomes, André Leite e José Vicente 
 
Out/2007 
147  Explaining Bank Failures in Brazil: Micro, Macro and Contagion Effects 
(1994-1998) 
Adriana Soares Sales and Maria Eduarda Tannuri-Pianto 
 
Oct/2007 
148  Um Modelo de Fatores Latentes com Variáveis Macroeconômicas para a 
Curva de Cupom Cambial 
Felipe Pinheiro, Caio Almeida e José Vicente 
 
Out/2007 





150  A Probabilistic Approach for Assessing the Significance of Contextual 
Variables in Nonparametric Frontier Models: an Application for 
Brazilian Banks 
Roberta Blass Staub and Geraldo da Silva e Souza 
 
Oct/2007 
151  Building Confidence Intervals with Block Bootstraps for the Variance 
Ratio Test of Predictability 
Nov/2007 
  Eduardo José Araújo Lima and Benjamin Miranda Tabak   
 
152  Demand for Foreign Exchange Derivatives in Brazil:  
Hedge or Speculation?  
Fernando N. de Oliveira and Walter Novaes  
 
Dec/2007 
153  Aplicação da Amostragem por Importância 
à Simulação de Opções Asiáticas Fora do Dinheiro 
Jaqueline Terra Moura Marins 
 
Dez/2007 
154  Identification of Monetary Policy Shocks in the Brazilian Market  
for Bank Reserves 
Adriana Soares Sales and Maria Tannuri-Pianto 
 
Dec/2007 
155  Does Curvature Enhance Forecasting? 
Caio Almeida, Romeu Gomes, André Leite and José Vicente 
 
Dec/2007 
156  Escolha do Banco e Demanda por Empréstimos: um Modelo de Decisão 
em Duas Etapas Aplicado para o Brasil 
Sérgio Mikio Koyama e Márcio I. Nakane 
 
Dez/2007 
157  Is the Investment-Uncertainty Link Really Elusive? The Harmful Effects 
of Inflation Uncertainty in Brazil 
Tito Nícias Teixeira da Silva Filho  
 
Jan/2008 
158  Characterizing the Brazilian Term Structure of Interest Rates 
Osmani T. Guillen and Benjamin M. Tabak 
 
Feb/2008 
159  Behavior and Effects of Equity Foreign Investors on Emerging Markets 
Barbara Alemanni and José Renato Haas Ornelas 
 
Feb/2008 
160  The Incidence of Reserve Requirements in Brazil: Do Bank Stockholders 
Share the Burden? 
Fábia A. de Carvalho and Cyntia F. Azevedo 
 
Feb/2008 
161  Evaluating Value-at-Risk Models via Quantile Regressions 
Wagner P. Gaglianone, Luiz Renato Lima and Oliver Linton 
 
Feb/2008 
162  Balance Sheet Effects in Currency Crises: Evidence from Brazil 
Marcio M. Janot, Márcio G. P. Garcia and Walter Novaes 
 
Apr/2008 
163  Searching for the Natural Rate of Unemployment in a Large Relative 
Price Shocks’ Economy: the Brazilian Case  
Tito Nícias Teixeira da Silva Filho  
 
May/2008 





165  Avaliação de Opções de Troca e Opções de Spread Européias e 
Americanas  
Giuliano Carrozza Uzêda Iorio de Souza, Carlos Patrício Samanez e 
Gustavo Santos Raposo 
Jul/2008  
  46
166  Testing Hyperinflation Theories Using the Inflation Tax Curve: a case 
study  
Fernando de Holanda Barbosa and Tito Nícias Teixeira da Silva Filho 
 
Jul/2008 
167  O Poder Discriminante das Operações de Crédito das Instituições 
Financeiras Brasileiras  
Clodoaldo Aparecido Annibal 
 
Jul/2008 
168  An Integrated Model for Liquidity Management and Short-Term Asset 
Allocation in Commercial Banks  
Wenersamy Ramos de Alcântara 
 
Jul/2008 
169  Mensuração do Risco Sistêmico no Setor Bancário com Variáveis 
Contábeis e Econômicas 
Lucio Rodrigues Capelletto, Eliseu Martins e Luiz João Corrar 
 
Jul/2008 
170  Política de Fechamento de Bancos com Regulador Não-Benevolente: 
Resumo e Aplicação 
Adriana Soares Sales 
 
Jul/2008 
171  Modelos para a Utilização das Operações de Redesconto pelos Bancos 
com Carteira Comercial no Brasil 
Sérgio Mikio Koyama e Márcio Issao Nakane 
 
Ago/2008 
172  Combining Hodrick-Prescott Filtering with a Production Function 




173  Exchange Rate Dynamics and the Relationship between the Random 
Walk Hypothesis and Official Interventions 





174  Foreign Exchange Market Volatility Information: an investigation of 
real-dollar exchange rate 




175  Evaluating Asset Pricing Models in a Fama-French Framework 
Carlos Enrique Carrasco Gutierrez and Wagner Piazza Gaglianone 
 
Dec/2008 
176  Fiat Money and the Value of Binding Portfolio Constraints 
Mário R. Páscoa, Myrian Petrassi and Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez 
 
Dec/2008 




178  An Econometric Contribution to the Intertemporal Approach of the 
Current Account 
Wagner Piazza Gaglianone and João Victor Issler 
 
Dec/2008 
179  Are Interest Rate Options Important for the Assessment of Interest 
Rate Risk? 
Caio Almeida and José Vicente 
 
Dec/2008 
180  A Class of Incomplete and Ambiguity Averse Preferences 
Leandro Nascimento and Gil Riella 
 
Dec/2008 
181  Monetary Channels in Brazil through the Lens of a Semi-Structural 
Model 
André Minella and Nelson F. Souza-Sobrinho 
Apr/2009  
  47
182  Avaliação de Opções Americanas com Barreiras Monitoradas de Forma 
Discreta 
Giuliano Carrozza Uzêda Iorio de Souza e Carlos Patrício Samanez 
 
Abr/2009 
183  Ganhos da Globalização do Capital Acionário em Crises Cambiais 
Marcio Janot e Walter Novaes 
 
Abr/2009 
184  Behavior Finance and Estimation Risk in Stochastic Portfolio 
Optimization 




185  Market Forecasts in Brazil: performance and determinants 
Fabia A. de Carvalho and André Minella 
 
Apr/2009 
186  Previsão da Curva de Juros: um modelo estatístico com variáveis 
macroeconômicas 
André Luís Leite, Romeu Braz Pereira Gomes Filho e José Valentim 
Machado Vicente 
 
Maio/2009 
 